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Abstract
Much of current comment on unemployment compensation schemes in Eastern Europe 
appears to be based on consideration of only a limited range cf the parameters 
in these schemes and with little attention paid to other sources of income 
support for the unemployed. Such an approach is inadequate and may give a 
misleading picture of both living standards and incentives to work. The paper 
considers in detail the functioning in principle of the income support system 
for the unemployed in Hungary. Some aspects of the functioning in practice 
of the central element - unemployment compensation - is then analysed using 
data from administrative sources. Payments do not appear to be particularly 
generous. The potential use of these data in econometric duration analysis 
is outlined.
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Unemployment compensation has an important role to play in the economic 
transformation of Eastern Europe as the countries of the region face up to 
substantial open unemployment and re-structuring of their labour markets. It 
is correspondingly important therefore that emerging systems of income support 
for the unemployed are subject to careful scrutiny. Are living standards of 
the unemployed adequate? Do the new unemployment benefit schemes create 
disincentives to work? Are there aspects of the benefits which help the 
operation of the labour market?
Much of the comment on the emerging benefit schemes seems to reflect an 
unfortunate aspect of the debate on these issues in the West: there is a 
tendency to draw conclusions based on inadequate evidence of the operation of 
systems of income support for the unemployed. It is not sufficient to merely 
look at the nominal replacement rate and duration of benefit which apply to 
an unemployed person who qualifies for unemployment compensation. And yet 
this seems to be the extent of the evidence on which some analysts of Eastern 
European labour markets now base their conclusions.
Experience in Western countries has shown that it is essential to 
consider the operation in practice of unemployment benefit schemes. How these 
work on the ground may differ considerably from that suggested by social 
security manuals. This has implications for coverage and actual benefit 
levels paid. The existence of other benefit schemes which may provide some 
income support to the unemployed needs to be taken into account, as do other 
sources of income together with the incomes of the families of the unemployed 
and the personal income tax system. The conclusions which are drawn about the 
level of income support for the unemployed and the likely impact of 
unemployment compensation on behaviour may be substantially altered when all 
these factors are taken into account. Support may appear either more or less 
generous than previously seemed the case.1
In this paper I look at some of these important aspects of income
Even then it might be argued that it is only with robust 
econometric evidence of the impact of benefits in Eastern Europe that reliable 
conclusions could be drawn; the many differences between OECD and Eastern 
European labour markets mean that considerable caution is needed if 
extrapolating from evidence relating to the former. And the paucity of robust 
evidence in much of the OECD area is a reminder that reliable estimates in 





























































































support for the unemployed in Eastern Europe. How do benefit systems work in 
practice? What other incomes are available to the unemployed? One of my 
principal aims is assess the information on which the continuing debate on 
unemployment compensation in Eastern Europe should be based.
I consider income support for the unemployed in just one country, 
Hungary. This choice is determined by three factors. First of all, Hungary 
was (as far as I can ascertain) the first Eastern European country to 
introduce a proper unemployment benefit scheme, this occurring in January 
1989.3 The Hungarian experience therefore covers nearly three years. Much 
of this has been in the context of a very low level of official unemployment 
but as Figure 1 shows the latter part of the period has seen unemployment 
accelerate rapidly to reach a figure of 5 percent by August 1991 (the 
distinction between official and unregistered unemployment is discussed 
later).3 Secondly, the operation of the Hungarian benefit system has 
generated a rich source of administrative data on unemployment spells. I try 
to demonstrate how these data can reveal important information about the 
process of unemployment and the payment of unemployment benefit in Hungary. 
The data give only part of the picture but it is important that they are 
exploited at a time when concrete information is at a premium. Thirdly, a 
completely new unemployment benefit scheme was passed into law by the 
Hungarian parliament in Spring 1991. Does this reform of the existing scheme 
provide lessons - positive or negative - for other Eastern European countries? 
Was there sufficient evidence at the time on income support for the unemployed 
in Hungary to ensure that this major reform dealt with the existing problems?
Section 2 describes the 1989 and 1991 Hungarian unemployment benefit 
systems and other relevant sources of income for the unemployed in Hungary. 
The purpose of this section is to show the range of factors influencing 
incomes in Hungary which need to be taken into account and to discuss how the 
income support system for the unemployed should work in principle. Section 
3 provides some information on how the central element of this system, 
unemployment benefit, actually has worked in practice. I discuss the numbers 
of unemployed who qualify for benefit, the actual levels of benefit paid, the
Ferge (1991) notes that earlier schemes listed in standard 
international reference works on social security did not function as genuine 
unemployment benefit systems.
The composition of registered unemployment in Hungary is discussed 




























































































administration of the system, and the duration and reasons for termination of 
spells of benefit receipt. Section 4 concludes. The paper does not include 
analysis of household survey data on the incomes of the unemployed nor do I 
provide any econometric evidence; the phenomena of unemployment and 
unemployment benefit are too recent in Eastern Europe for the necessary data 
to be readily available. But I do discuss how the administrative data on 
benefit spells collected in Hungary could be used in econometric analysis were 
they to be released.
I concentrate on unemployment compensation to the exclusion of any 
discussion of "active" labour market measures such as re-training and job 
creation schemes. These too need careful evaluation for which there is 
insufficient space in this paper.*
2. The Income Support System for the Unemployed
The starting point for any current analysis of income support for the 
unemployed in Hungary is the 1989 and 1991 unemployment compensation schemes. 
Some of the principal features of these are given in Tables 1 and 2. In 
essence, the 1989 scheme paid at most two years of benefit to someone who had 
spent at least half of the previous three years in employment. Benefits in 
both the first - Unemployment Benefit (UB) - and second years - Temporary 
Allowance (TA) - were related to past earnings and were not subject to a 
means-test. Funding of both benefits was from the state budget. The 1991 
scheme (which came into effect in July) represents a change to an explicit 
system of Unemployment Insurance (UI) funded through contributions from both 
workers and employers, benefit again being related to past earnings. In 
addition a new flat-rate benefit is introduced for young entrants to the 
labour force.
There exists a view that governments should concentrate resources 
on schemes to provide training, employment opportunities or grants for new 
businesses and should provide only a minimum level of unemployment benefit. 
But the type of active labour market measure and the operation on the ground 
are important. In 1989 the Hungarian government set-up a scheme providing 
loans for new businesses to unemployed persons at zero interest for the first 
four years. The scheme was abandoned in mid-1990 amid allegations that it was 
being exploited by members of the outgoing Communist administration and that 





























































































7) Benefit levels and entitlement periods
The two features of the 1989 scheme which appear to have attracted the 
most attention are the benefit-earnings replacement rates and the duration of 
benefit entitlement. In principle, the initial replacement rate of 70 percent 
of earnings applies in both the 1989 and 1991 schemes to fresh claims 
initiated through lay-off. How should one judge this level of earnings 
replacement? Jackman and Layard (1990) describe it as "relatively high" 
(p.10), an implicit comparison appearing to be made with replacement rates in 
Western countries. For those who face being made redundant a high replacement 
rate can be thought of as playing a positive economic role, since it provides 
an incentive to workers to accept the redundancy and allow re-structuring to 
take place; concern about disincentives to return to work should be about the 
ratio of benefit to prospective rather than past earnings. However, the 
principal point I wish to make is that a uni-dimensional comparison is quite 
insufficient; other differences between countries need to be taken into 
account when comparing replacement rates.
One of these is the tax treatment of earnings and benefits. In Germany, 
for example, the initial replacement rate for a claimant qualifying for UI is 
63 percent but this is applied to previous earnings net of income tax with 
benefit then being untaxed. Benefits in Hungary on the other hand are 
calculated as a percent of gross earnings and then are subject to income tax. 
The progressive personal income tax (introduced in 1988) implies that the 
average tax rate applied to unemployment benefit may be lower than that on 
previous earnings. In this case the net replacement rate will rise above 70 
percent. In fact this will always be the case since a lower rate of social 
insurance deductions applies to unemployment benefit than to earnings (see 
Tables 1 and 2). Moreover, the substantial changes that have occurred to the 
rate structure of the personal income tax system since its introduction in 
1988 together with the different rate of social insurance deductions applied 
to unemployment benefit under the 1991 scheme (a zero rate) mean that the 
initial "net" replacement rate is not the same under the 1989 and 1991 
schemes, unlike the "gross" rate of 70 percent.5 Consideration of the 
deductions applied to benefits and earnings imply that effective replacement 
of earnings in the Hungarian unemployment compensation scheme is in fact
In 1989 there were 8 marginal income tax rates (including zero); 




























































































greater than has been realised by some commentators.
The failure to consider the lack of indexing of gross earnings in the 
benefit calculations implies the opposite. Benefit in Hungary is calculated 
on the basis of average monthly earnings with the last employer. Where the 
last job was held for the previous 12 months, it is the average throughout 
this period which apparently applies with no indexing for wage movements 
either before or during the unemployment spell.6 This has implications for 
both living standards during unemployment and the ratio of benefit to 
prospective earnings. The difference from a situation where earnings are 
indexed (or where benefit is based on earnings in a short period immediately 
prior to unemployment, as in some Western European schemes) may be significant 
even for those claimants who enter unemployment direct from employment. The 
absence of any indexing has a negative impact on effective earnings 
replacement, the purchasing power of the benefit being lower than suggested 
by the gross replacement rates. Average industrial wages in the first six 
months of 1991 were 35 percent above their level in the equivalent period in 
1990; consumer prices rose by 17 percent in 1989, by 29 percent in 1990, and 
at an annual rate of 36 percent in the first six months of 1991 (Kozponti 
Statisztikai Hivatal, 1991, pp.19 and 39). Inflation at this level results 
in a substantial erosion of the purchasing power of unemployment benefits and 
lower ratios of benefit to prospective earnings than would be suggested by the 
parameters of the scheme. And as a result the simple comparison of the gross 
replacement rate in Hungary with that in other countries may again be 
misleading.
Discussion of the adequacy of income support or the incentives to work 
implied by the benefit formula is complicated by the existence of a minimum 
level of benefit and by the special provisions which surround this. The 
(gross) minimum benefit payable is linked to the prevailing minimum wage in 
both the 1991 scheme and in the previous system (1990 only). Since the 
minimum wage has been raised several times a year during 1989-91 (see Table 
3) this means that benefit paid under the provisions relating to the minimum 
level has been periodically indexed. Indeed, there have been real increases 
in benefit levels linked to the minimum wage; the average level of the minimum 
wage in 1990 was 35 percent higher than in 1989 (weighting the figures in
If the time with the last employer was less than 12 months then 





























































































Table 3 by the number of months for which each figure applied) compared to the 
figure of 29 percent for prices noted above.
In principle, benefit was subject to a floor of 80 percent of the 
minimum wage in 1990 and 100 percent from 1991. This might appear to imply 
that the floor under the 1991 scheme for all those persons with previous 
earnings less than or equal to 1.43 times the minimum wage will be the 
prevailing minimum wage. The numbers of persons potentially affected would 
appear to be large: some 22 percent of full-time employees in September 1990 
fell into this category - see Table 4 (8,000 forints per month is 1.43 times 
the minimum wage of 5,600 forints for September 1990 shown in Table 3). In 
practice however, this calculation is misleading since under the provisions 
determining minimum benefit, if the previous average earnings which are taken 
as a basis for the calculation fall below the prevailing minimum wage, benefit 
is set equal to that previous average earnings level. This provision may 
apply not infrequently since the minimum wage is periodically adjusted but 
previous earnings are not indexed when calculating benefit.7 Although these 
benefit payments are also adjusted (proportionately) in line with increases 
in the minimum wage the absolute level of benefit is clearly less.
Figure 2 summarises the provisions relating to the UB and UI formulae 
in 1990 and 1991. Benefit is shown on the vertical axis and earnings on the 
horizontal axis, both as a percent of the minimum wage (all calculations refer 
to gross amounts). The solid line shows the benefit-earnings schedule in 
1991; the dashed line indicates the 1990 schedule where there was any 
difference. The schedule depicted is that which applies in the first half of 
the entitlement period to benefit (and- in the case of the 1990 scheme to a 
person entering unemployment through layoff). The 1991 schedule has two flat 
segments implying fixed levels of benefit. These are when previous earnings 
are between 1.0 and 1.43 times and above 4.29 times the current minimum wage 
(the latter situation resulting in benefit at the maximum level). There are 
two positively sloped segments during which benefit is 100 percent or 70 
percent of previous average earnings. The distribution of actual benefit
Current wages can also be less than the prevailing minimum (Tables 
3 and 4 suggest that this was true for some 5 percent of full-time employees 
in September 1990). One reason for this is that the minimum relates to the 
situation where all performance targets are met. When orders are low, manual 
workers paid by result could legally be paid less than the minimum. I am 
grateful to Maria Lado for discussion on these and other points relating to 




























































































payments across these four possible segments is an empirical question which 
remains to be established. . It is worth noting that the 1991 scheme removed 
what appears to have been an anomaly in the 1990 scheme. A strict 
interpretation of the rules applying in 1990 given in Table 1 suggests that 
benefit fell when previous earnings rose above the current minimum level and 
did not reach the earlier level again until previous earnings reached 1.43 
times the current minimum. Whether these arrangements were actually applied 
in practice is unclear to me.
The second aspect of the Hungarian scheme which has attracted critical 
attention among Western analysts is the duration of benefit entitlement. 
There is a view among some writers that the duration of benefit has more 
effect on incentives than its level (e.g. Jackman et al, 1990) although the 
evidence produced in support of this claim is far from conclusive (with the 
exception of some high quality results based on principally US microdata - see 
Atkinson and Micklewright, forthcoming). The total of two years of benefit 
under the 1989 scheme might be thought to have resulted in a disincentive 
problem. Two points need however to be borne in mind. First, the duration 
of entitlement should not be seen as a separate issue from the benefit level; 
the formal reduction in the replacement rate over the benefit period in 
Hungary is important to bear in mind as is the lack of benefit indexing. 
Secondly, the treatment of those persons recurrently unemployed is important. 
Entitlement to UB under the 1989 scheme was to 12 months in a three year 
period and not to 12 months in the case of each claim satisfying the 
conditions for benefit.8 A person who had a spell of 9 months of UB receipt 
in the 1989 scheme would be able to draw UB for a total of only 3 more months 
in the next two and a quarter years; entitlement would therefore soon expire 
if subsequent unemployment occurred.
7 /) Other parameters of the 1989 and 1991 schemes
There are several other important aspects of the unemployment benefit 
schemes in Hungary besides the benefit rates and entitlement periods. An 
aspect of unemployment schemes which is frequently overlooked by economists 
is the administrative sanctions against "voluntary" unemployment which may be 
present. Both the 1989 and 1991 schemes allow for sanctions against those
Although I have been unable to establish the details I understand 




























































































whom the authorities believe are not making sufficient efforts to find work. 
Benefit can be withheld from those who "fail to co-operate" with the 
employment centre where they are registered, and the wording of the relevant 
legislation suggests that the interpretation of these circumstances could be 
broad. Benefit is again discontinued if the claimant "refuses a suitable job 
or training possibility" suggested by the employment centre. In the 1991 
scheme a job is considered suitable if the wage is equal to the unemployment 
benefit; this implies that in principle an individual cannot set his or her 
reservation wage greater than the level of unemployment benefit without fear 
of disqualification, something not allowed for in the standard treatment of 
unemployment benefit in the theory of job search (Atkinson and Micklewright, 
forthcoming). These sanctions may of course be much less easy to apply in a 
time of high unemployment when greater demands are placed on the time of 
employment centre staff but their existence cannot simply be ignored.
Sanctions may also be applied at the time of the initial claim. The 
decision to voluntarily quit work and enter unemployment or to shirk on the 
job in such a manner to risk being fired can be expected to be influenced 
under the 1991 scheme by the regulations suspending entitlement to benefit for 
3 months. No such regulations applied in the 1989 scheme which simply paid 
a slightly lower rate of benefit. Judgement as to the appropriate penalty for 
voluntary unemployment is difficult without concrete evidence as to the impact 
of the previous provisions. The knowledge that voluntary quitting does not 
lead to denial of benefit may increase the incentive for the unemployed to 
take jobs which may turn out to be unsuitable. This may be important in the 
present period of rapid labour market change when the "quality" of new jobs 
being generated is uncertain. For this reason, the 1991 change is not 
necessarily an improvement.
The eligibility conditions for benefit (which were relaxed by the 1991 
scheme) are discussed further in the next section. Finally, although the 
funding of unemployment compensation is not central to the main purpose of 
this paper, the difference in arrangements between the 1989 and 1991 schemes 
is sufficiently important to be worthy of comment. Payments from both workers 
and employers in the latter are made into a "Solidarity Fund" which may have 
some important psychological value and may help to de-stigmatise benefit 
receipt. It also implies re-distribution from those in safe to risky jobs 
although the same is true of funding from progressive personal income tax via 




























































































a system of experience-rating, as in the US, in which the employers' payments 
are (positively) related to their past lay-off behaviour, although such a move 
should be avoided for the foreseeable future since it could be expected to 
discourage enterprise re-structuring.s
iii) Other sources of income support
The discussion to this point has focused on the explicit unemployment 
benefits that a person entering unemployment may or may not receive under the 
unemployment compensation schemes introduced in 1989 and 1991. But both 
adequacy of income support and incentives to work will be affected by other 
sources of income available to unemployed people.10 In several respects these 
are very different to those in Western labour markets.
First, a prominent feature of the Hungarian labour market is the 
occurrence of second jobs. Survey data for 1989 indicate that (i) some 60 
percent of households had a small agricultural plot, (ii) in 36 percent of 
households at least one individual had income from a second job, and (iii) 12 
percent of households reported "invisible" income from tips, illegal jobs etc; 
the monthly averages of gross income in 1989 from these sources for those 
households in receipt were 2,825, 4,454, and 2,430 forints respectively which 
may be compared with a figure for average gross earnings in "first" jobs of 
10,458 forints (Kupa and Fajth, 1990, Table 2.6/a and Appendix Table 8). Both 
the proportions of households with such income and the average amounts in 
payment rose with the level of household per capita income (the exception was 
the incidence of agricultural plots). This suggests that the importance of 
second economy income to households experiencing unemployment will depend on 
from where in the income distribution the unemployed are drawn. If the 
claimant has a second job which continues during unemployment, then this will 
contribute to living standards while unemployed and the ratio of total income 
received to that when fully employed is higher relative to the situation where 
there is no second job. On the other hand, if the second job is associated
The contribution rates in the 1991 scheme appear to be 
unsustainably low on any reasonable prediction of the future course of 
unemployment.
The standard job search model requires an assumption of risk 
aversion or utility from leisure before income unaffected by employment status 




























































































with the first economy workplace, unemployment may lead to the loss of both 
jobs and living standards when unemployed will be determined by unemployment 
benefit alone; the drop in income in this case will be greater than if no 
second job was held.
Critical here is the treatment of second job income in the rules of the 
unemployment compensation system. This seems unclear. On the one hand the 
legislation introducing the 1991 scheme notes that benefit is to be paid only 
to the "unemployed" defined as a person "engaged in no other work done for 
remuneration" (Act IV of 1991 on Employment Promotion and Provision for 
Unemployed Persons. Article 58). On the other disqualification from benefit 
in the case of "gainful activity" (Article 28) is applied only if the income 
from this exceeds the minimum wage (there is no tapered cut-off). This would 
appear to be very permissive and there is in addition that work which is not 
reported to the benefit authorities and goes undetected.11
Consideration of second jobs shows how important it is to have household 
survey data recording all the incomes of unemployed persons. The same applies 
to incomes of (or in respect of) other household members. The presence of 
other persons in the claimant's household may influence the unemployed 
person's living standards either way. Where an unemployed person has a spouse 
who is employed, per capita household income may be higher, depending on the 
level of the spouse's earnings. If the spouse has any income then the ratio 
of household income with one partner unemployed to that where both work will 
always be higher than the unemployed partner's benefit/earnings ratio alone. 
The high incidence of two-earner families, with both partners in full-time 
work, in Hungary (as in other Eastern European countries) needs to be borne 
in mind. This again is a difference from most OECD countries where 
participation rates of married women are typically lower.
The presence of children in the households of the unemployed is a 
reminder that the unemployment benefit system must not be viewed in isolation 
from other parts of the social security system. An important source of income 
security for the Hungarian unemployed with children is provided by universal 
family allowance, payable in respect of every child up to the end of 
schooling. In September 1990, the monthly payment for a two-parent family
The problem of the treatment of subsidiary income arises in other 
Eastern European countries. Gora (1991) notes that persons in the large class 
of "peasant-workers" in Poland who combine wage employment with working their 




























































































with two children represented 38 percent of median gross monthly earnings.1' 
This level of support is very generous (relative to wages) in comparison to 
that provided by similar schemes in many Western European countries (although 
the continuation of payments in the future at this sort of level cannot be 
taken for granted). The effect of the family allowance is to raise the 
household income replacement rate, since the payment is unconditional on the 
employment status of the parents.
On the other hand, means-tested social assistance benefit of last resort 
is restrictive in Hungary, and does not appear to be a scheme on which the 
unemployed who have exhausted benefit or who do not qualify could expect to 
rely.13 This situation also contrasts with that in much of Western Europe 
(but is similar to that in the US) where means-tested social assistance is 
more widely available for the unemployed (in the UK it is the most important 
source of income support for the unemployed stock).
As an example of the difference that consideration of the family can 
make to the picture of income support, assume that an unemployed man receives 
5,000 forints (net) per month in unemployment compensation, with previous net 
earnings of 7,000 Forints (assuming away the lack of indexing). If he has a 
wife earning 5,000 Forints then the household income replacement ratio rises 
from 71 percent to 83 percent. With two children and a family allowance of 
4,140 Forints (in the first half of 1990), the replacement rate rises to 88 
percent.
These sorts of calculations are illustrative of the possible differences 
which household composition and other sources of income can make. However, 
they are not a sufficient basis on which to judge policy reform. It may be 
that the participation rate of wives of unemployed men is lower than average, 
as in OECD countries (Micklewright and Giannelli, 1991). The joint 
distribution of wages of two earner families needs to be considered. Second 
economy income could alter the picture either way. Experience in OECD 
economies has shown the importance of using survey microdata on a 
representative sample of the unemployed containing full information on their
Family Allowance for such a family was raised in August 1990 to 
4,340 forints per month (figure supplied by Ministry of Social Welfare). 
Median gross earnings for full-time workers in September 1990 was 11,290 
forints per month (interpolated linearly from Table 3).





























































































family and household characteristics and the different income sources (e.g. 
Atkinson and Micklewright 1985, Moylan et al 1984). The collection of 
household survey data on the unemployed in Hungary to aid assessment of the 
income support system must be seen as a matter of urgency.
3. Unemployment Benefit in Practice
Some aspects of the unemployment compensation system can be assessed 
using data collected as part of the administration of benefit payments. It 
is particularly important to exploit such data during the early years of a new 
benefit scheme. A good example of this is provided by the investigations of 
the British Ministry of Labour in the inter-war period in which the record of 
unemployment benefit claims over a number of years was examined for a one 
percent sample of the labour force. This showed clearly the inadequacy of the 
original system of unemployment insurance in Britain set up in the 1920s.
In the case of Hungary, the National Labour Centre (NLC), which is 
responsible for the payment of unemployment benefit and the administration of 
the employment service, collects detailed information on each spell of 
unemployment compensation receipt. This information is stored in computerised 
form, first on PCs at the local employment offices and then in centralised 
records. This procedure has been followed from the first introduction of 
unemployment compensation in January 1989 and is a reflection of the 
development of the employment service in earlier years (registration of 
unemployed job seekers first began in 1986). I refer to this source as the 
"benefit spell" data in what follows. The process of job matching and benefit 
calculation requires details of each claimant's age, sex, partial work 
history, previous job earnings, occupation and skills; these are recorded for 
each successful claim for unemployment compensation together with the level 
of benefit payment. When the spell of benefit is finished a code is added to 
the computer record indicating the reason for the end of payment e.g. new job, 
retirement, death, disqualification.1*
The NLC benefit spell data represent a rich source, providing 
information on important aspects of the complete population of spells of
The NLC publishes a monthly bulletin which draws on these data 
together with information from the unemployment register. I refer to this 




























































































unemployment in which unemployment compensation was paid. This section draws 
heavily on these data. The source has two principal drawbacks. The first is 
the restriction to successful benefit claims; there is no information on 
spells of unemployment in which no unemployment compensation is paid. The 
second is the limited range of information; since the NLC benefit spell data 
is an administrative register, a range of information relating to claimants' 
households is missing which would be necessary for a full appraisal of the 
adequacy and behavioral impact of the income support system - even one 
restricted to those unemployed who do receive benefits.
In this section I analyse NLC benefit spell data from 1989 and 1990 
which provide information on the operation of the 1989 unemployment 
compensation scheme. The section is in three parts. First, I look at the 
coverage of unemployment compensation; what proportion of the unemployed 
received benefits under the 1989 scheme? Secondly, information on the level 
of payments made in the system is analysed; how generous has unemployment 
compensation been in practice? Thirdly, the labour market exit states from 
spells of unemployment compensation receipt are considered; how do spells of 
benefit receipt finish in Hungary?
i) coverage of unemployment compensation
Taken at face value the available national statistics on benefit 
coverage appear quite encouraging. For example, in December 1990, the numbers 
of persons receiving unemployment compensation under the terms of the 1989 
scheme (LIB or TA) represented 78 percent of the total registered unemployed 
(Table 5). Not only is this figure high by international standards but the 
numbers of those unemployed without benefit include some who are receiving 
training allowances (such persons would normally be excluded from the official 
count of unemployment in Western countries).15 (Reasons for the lack of 
benefit among other registered unemployed are discussed below.) There are two 
sets of reasons however why some caution is needed when interpreting what 
seems to be a reasonably optimistic picture of coverage of registered 
unemployment. Both may be expected to be of general importance in the labour
The data sources for the count of registrants and of benefit 
recipients are in fact separate in Hungary and despite official procedures 
being to the contrary benefit recipients may not always form a sub-set of 




























































































markets of other Eastern European economies in transition.
First, the high coverage is of the officially registered unemployed, 
rather than the total of those persons looking for work. Those unemployed who 
do not register with the employment service to claim benefit will not enter 
the figures. The distinction between unemployment defined on an 
administrative criterion of registration and a behavioral criterion of search 
has been shown to be important in the OECD area. It is possible that the 
benefit coverage of searchers is little different from that of the registered 
unemployed. This appears to be the case in Britain; the two totals of the 
unemployed are very similar (there are large numbers of registered unemployed 
who are not actively searching for work but there are similar numbers 
searching who are not registered (Micklewright, 1990)). The picture in 
Hungary in 1990 appears to have been very different. Evidence from the 
population census held in January 1990 shows that the number of persons who 
considered themselves unemployed at that time exceeded the numbers officially 
registered by a factor of five: 110,000 in the census (Lado et al, 1991, p . 12) 
compared to 23,000 registered. The wording of the relevant questions on 
unemployment in the census was apparently simple and the results cannot be 
considered as reliable as those given by the more sophisticated design of 
questions in household interview labour force surveys used in OECD countries 
(see OECD, 1987, chapter 5). This is one reason why the initiative of the 
Hungarian CS0 to start such surveys in 1991 is so welcome.16
The ratio of registered to unregistered unemployment may well be higher 
in late 1991 than suggested by the 1990 census results: it seems unlikely that 
the true unemployment rate was over 20 percent in August 1991. Nevertheless 
the problems of unregistered unemployment and a failure to claim benefits are 
likely to persist to some degree. Why does this occur? One problem concerns 
the way claims to benefit are handled. The research by Nagy (1991) suggests 
that in 1989 there were significant numbers of unemployed persons in Hungary 
who despite being eligible for unemployment compensation under the 1989 scheme 
did not in fact receive benefits. Nagy investigated in detail the 
entitlements and claims of a sample of persons who had spent time registered
The CS0 conducted a one-off labour force survey of some 30,000 
households during April-June 1991 and the intention is to conduct a regular 
survey with a quarterly rotating sample starting in 1992. A number of authors 
have rightly argued the need for measures of unemployment in Eastern European 
countries based on a job search criterion as would be permitted by labour 




























































































as looking for work at eight employment offices in an area of above-average 
unemployment in mid-1989. He concluded that only a little over one quarter 
of those 376 persons in his sample who appeared to have a satisfactory work 
history for UB had actually made a successful claim.
The most important cause of non-receipt among those apparently eligible 
was the failure to make a formal claim: some 85 percent of formal claims were 
in fact successful. It might be thought that the low rate of claims was due 
to ignorance of the existence of unemployment benefit in what was the first 
year of the scheme's existence. However, Nagy concluded that the failure to 
make a claim was not in general due to lack of information on the part of the 
unemployed. On the contrary, the employment office clerks recorded large 
numbers of unemployed as having expressed a need for unemployment benefit. 
But,
"Asking for aid and applying for it are two totally different 
things. Whether a request becomes a written application depends 
decisively on the clerks: they are supposed to provide and 
collect the forms, they are to turn an oral request into an 
official case. Our experiences prompt us to say that benefit 
applications are preceded by a selection based on several 
arguments" (Nagy, 1991).
In other words, employment office clerks, it is argued by Nagy, systematically 
discouraged eligible unemployed individuals from claiming benefit.
There is a clear potential for administrative mistakes in the early 
phase of the first unemployment compensation scheme in a transition economy; 
it takes time for local office staff to become familiar with the rules. 
However, error free of any motive is likely to be both Type I and II. Nagy's 
investigations in Hungary suggest that local staff in 1989 were erring more 
in one direction and making substantial Type I error; this appeared to be due 
to a combination of their own view of the purpose of the employment office 
(finding jobs and providing benefit only as a last resort) coupled with a 
prejudice against the unemployed.
A negative official attitude towards unemployment at the "sharp-end" of 
the benefit system may, where it exists, be primarily a feature of the initial 
period of labour market change in transition economies. It is at least to be 
hoped so, although "hassle" and stigma are features of social security in OECD 




























































































social security system of any country.1’ The employment service in Hungary 
has expanded significantly since mid-1989 and staff recruitment and training 
have received careful attention. Nevertheless, Nagy's findings for Hungary 
are a reminder that unemployment benefit systems often may not follow the 
"rule-book" operation that many who comment on their impact assume.
The second reason for caution when viewing the coverage figures stems 
from the type of unemployment at the time. The apparently high coverage of 
unemployment benefit (UB) at the end of 1990 in part reflects the small 
amounts of long-term and recurrent unemployment so far experienced in Hungary. 
These types of unemployment will erode coverage through exhaustion of 
entitlement to limited duration benefit. Both have been prominent features 
of the experience of unemployment in the "mature" labour markets of OECD 
economies; those unemployed over a year represented more than 40 percent of 
the unemployed stock in 1987 in all but two European Community countries (CEC, 
1989, p.119); one-half of the male inflow into registered unemployment in the 
UK in Autumn 1978 had a spell of registered unemployment in the previous 12 
months (Moylan et al, 1984, p.24). Both factors have contributed to the low 
coverage by unemployment insurance in several countries: in Britain and West 
Germany, only one-quarter and two-fifths respectively of the registered 
unemployed stock were in receipt of insurance benefit in 1988 (Micklewright, 
1991, Table 1).
The very small number of people receiving the Temporary Allowance (see 
Table 5) is evidence of the low level of long-term unemployment in Hungary at 
the end of 1990; Temporary Allowance was paid under the 1989 scheme only to 
those exhausting the one year of UB entitlement. The NLC benefit spell data 
suggest that recurrent unemployment has also been much less common so far in 
Hungary than in Western countries: only 5 percent of those receiving any 
unemployment compensation during the two years 1989-90 did so on more than one 
occasion (the figure varies across the country - see Table 6). The emergence 
of a significant amount of long-term unemployment can be expected as those 
workers with characteristics which are less attractive to employers struggle
Some 17 percent of a sample of claims to social assistance in the 
UK in 1975 were found to contain some kind of administrative error 




























































































to find new work.1" The creation of new private sector firms, some of which 
will fail, may be expected to increase the amount of recurrent unemployment, 
as will the development of temporary jobs, a prominent feature of Western 
European labour markets.1" The stance of employment law is important here; 
recurrent unemployment may also be expected to be more frequent if there is 
little protection against dismissal.
How do the 1989 and 1991 schemes compare in terms of the proportion of 
the unemployed who will be covered by unemployment compensation? The NLC does 
not at present appear to collect data that gives a breakdown of the different 
reasons for non-receipt of benefits (which is a cause for concern). However, 
it seems likely that the most important reason is the lack of an adequate 
employment record; the 1989 scheme offered no support to the person who could 
not satisfy the work history requirement of 18 months employment in the 
previous three years.
The 1991 scheme should significantly increase the proportion of the 
inflow to unemployment qualifying for benefit. The new career entrant's 
benefit represents a major addition to the income support system, although the 
three month waiting period for benefit should be noted. The fact that the 
benefit is not related to parental income represents an important new 
principle in a social security system in which relatives' duty to maintain has 
traditionally been emphasised. The minimum employment requirement for UI of 
one year in the previous four also represents an easing of the eligibility 
requirements compared to those for the 1989 UB scheme. However, if long-term 
unemployment is concentrated on those with poorer employment histories, the 
1991 scheme will fail to substitute for the cover provided by the system it 
replaces; the total of two years of entitlement previously provided by UB and 
TA is only available under the 1991 scheme to those with a history of 
continuous work in the four years prior to unemployment. As far as recurrent 
unemployment is concerned, I am not clear whether the previous arrangement 
limiting the total duration of benefit within a period of years (12 months 
over 3 years in the 1989 scheme) will continue to apply. If not, exhaustion
Of course, some would argue that the emergence of long-term 
unemployment In Eastern Europe will depend principally on the unemployment 
benefit systems themselves via any disincentives to work that they generate 
(Jackman and Layard, 1990).
The growth in private sector firms in Hungary in 1989-90 is 





























































































of entitlement may come about through repeated short spells of unemployment 
as well as single long spells. In short therefore, the long-term changes in 
coverage as a result of the 1991 changes are less clear. More generally, the 
switch to a system in which, conditional on satisfying the eligibility 
conditions for benefit, the period of UI entitlement depends on the employment 
record (broadly speaking one month of benefit for every two months of previous 
employment) seems an unnecessary change. It is in line with practice in some 
OECD countries (although not all, for example Sweden and the UK have benefit 
periods which are the same for all eligible claimants) but this is not a 
persuasive argument in favour.
11) Benefit levels paid
The absolute levels of unemployment compensation paid are relevant to 
the discussion of both living standards and incentives for the unemployed. 
What levels of benefits, in practice, are actually paid out? Table 7 gives 
some information on the distribution and mean values of gross benefit amounts 
paid out to all those persons receiving unemployment compensation for at least 
one day at some time during 1990 (the information is given in terms of monthly 
rates).
What may these figures be compared with? As far as incentives to work 
are concerned one yardstick is the minimum (gross) wage which in theory should 
be the floor for wage offers. A weighted average of the different rates 
applicable during 1990 gives a figure of just over 5,000 forints (Table 3). 
Table 7 shows that half of all UB payments and the vast majority of all TA 
payments were beneath this level; it appears that there were large numbers of 
unemployed persons during 1990 who were receiving gross benefit payments at 
or below the minimum level of wages that they would have been legally entitled 
to in the event of a job offer. The distribution of wage offers is of course 
unobserved. We do however have information about the distribution of earnings 
in payment; the situation in September 1990 was shown earlier in Table 4. The 
minimum wage at this time was 5,600 forints, exactly half of the median 
monthly wage (interpolating linearly within the relevant range); it appears 
that perhaps half of the unemployed received gross benefits of half the median 
wage or less.
Against this it should be noted that the discussion in Section 2 is 




























































































wages to be considered. And the legal minimum may be ignored by some 
employers implying that the incentive problem may be greater than a focus on 
this yardstick suggests. Nevertheless, it does not seem to be the case that 
the majority of the unemployed in 1990 were receiving benefits which came 
close to the wages that they might reasonably expect to receive in work.
As far as living standards of the unemployed are concerned, the obvious 
yardstick is the figure for the subsistence minimum monthly income calculated 
by the CSO (these calculations have been made since the early 1980s, see 
Salamin, 1991). This figure is intended to indicate a level of income
"rendering possible merely to satisfy the very modest necessities 
conventionally qualified as essential to ensure continuous 
living" (Hungarian CSO, Statistical Yearbook 1988. [English- 
Russian edition] p.312).
The minimum is calculated for a number of different family types. The 1990 
summary figure averaging across different family types was 5,900 forints of 
net per capita income (Cukor and Kovari, 1991, p.182). Table 7 shows that the 
average gross Unemployment Benefit in 1990 almost exactly equalled this level; 
the average Temporary Allowance figure fell short by some 30 percent. 
Although the picture may be modified by consideration of other sources of 
income available to the unemployed, these figures suggest that in practice 
many unemployed people in Hungary receive benefit payments that provide them 
with only a modest standard of living. They call into question arguments such 
as that of Holzmann (1990) that the unemployment compensation scheme is 
"rather generous" (p.9).
Hi) Spells of Benefit Receipt
The typical discussion of the impact of unemployment benefit on the 
labour market assumes that all spells of unemployment finish in employment. 
This in turn dictates the incentive to leave unemployment which people have 
in mind: the incentive to take up employment. How do spells finish in 
Hungary? The NLC benefit spell data provide a partial answer to this 
question; for those unemployed persons who do receive unemployment 
compensation the data record the reason for the spell of benefit ending. 
During 1989-90 some 14 percent of spells of Unemployment Benefit with a 
termination date falling in these two years ended with exhaustion of 




























































































not presumably represent unemployment which has actually finished; in the 
terminology of the econometric literature on unemployment duration the spells 
are "right-censored1' (e.g. Kiefer, 1988). (The same may of course apply to 
some of the other causes of spell termination.) In general the exhaustion of 
UB would have triggered entitlement to Temporary Allowance. The importance 
of each reason for the end of the remaining 86 percent of spells of UB is 
given in Table 8, distinguishing spells by the total duration of benefit 
receipt and by the sex of the claimant (the very small number of spells 
lasting beyond a year and not ceasing in exhaustion have been excluded).
The median completed duration of UB receipt among these spells appears 
to have been just under 3 months for both sexes. This figure must not be 
interpreted as the expected duration of UB receipt, still less of 
unemployment, both of which will be higher: Table 8 excludes both those UB 
spells ending in exhaustion of entitlement and all those spells in the stock 
of unemployed at the end of 1990.“
Overall about two-thirds of spells ended with the individual obtaining 
employment or entering a government employment scheme (events which 
unfortunately cannot be separated in the data). The proportion is slightly 
higher for men and for both sexes is higher for shorter spells of benefit 
receipt; 72 percent of male spells of up to 1 month long end in employment 
compared to 58 percent of spells of over 6-11 months. There is some 
suggestion therefore that the exit probabilities to different states are 
determined in different ways although this cannot be concluded with certainty 
from tabulated data. The cause of termination of about half of the remaining 
spells is unknown, this being somewhat more common for women; some of these 
spells may end in employment not notified to the NLC, some may end in 
withdrawal from the labour force. If these spells are excluded from the 
calculation the proportion of spells ending in employment or a government 
scheme rises to about 80 percent for both sexes.
An exit from the benefit register to employment was therefore certainly 
the most important cause of termination of spells of unemployment benefit in 
Hungary in 1989-90. However, this leaves a fifth of spells which ended for 
other known reasons, leaving aside those that ended in exhaustion of
The same comment applies to another figure which has been quite 
widely reported: the mean duration of benefit receipt for all those 
experiencing some unemployment in the year (e.g. Hars et al, 1991, p.171, 
Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, 1991a, p .8). This is a mean calculated across 




























































































entitlement and those where the cause of termination was not recorded. 
Amongst other things, their existence is a reminder that any discussion of the 
process of leaving unemployment needs to distinguish the state to which exit 
occurs.
Particularly noteworthy is the termination of a spell of UB due to 
disqualification for "failure to co-operate" with the local employment office 
attempting to find the claimant work. This accounted for 7 percent of all 
terminations shown in Table 8. Of course, the numbers may be interpreted in 
a variety of ways. On the one hand it might be argued that they show a 
significant minority of the unemployed in Hungary to be failing to conduct job 
search and it is possible that the numbers actually disqualified represent the 
mere tip of an ice-berg. On the other hand it could be argued that the data 
show the threat of disqualification to be a significant one with likely 
consequences for other individuals' behaviour. One certainly can conclude at 
least that the administrative sanctions which exist in the Hungarian benefit 
system against "voluntary unemployment" do not go unused; individuals entering 
unemployment in 1989-90 could not rely on being able to draw benefits with no 
checks made on their behaviour, as is often assumed in much popular and 
academic debate about unemployment compensation. In addition to 
disqualification for "failure to co-operate" the benefit of a small number of 
claimants (about 1 percent of the total) was terminated since the individual 
had earned income of more than the minimum wage. Whether there are many 
instances of employment while receiving benefit that go undetected (or 
unreported) is a moot question; the high incidence of second jobs in Hungary 
was described in Section 2.
Exit to government re-training programmes also account for 6-7 percent 
of exits from benefit in Table 8, the probability of this type of exit rising 
with the duration of benefit receipt. This is a form of exit which, like 
employment, is one which the Hungarian government wishes to encourage; the 
1991 unemployment compensation scheme has a number of provisions in this 
respect. The same is true of exit to retirement, the 1991 scheme bringing in 
early retirement provisions for those individuals who have been unemployed 6 
months and who are within 3 years of retirement age. These are exit states 
whose importance may increase in the future. Their existence is a reminder 
that the incentives that the government must concern itself with extend beyond 
just that of taking up new work.




























































































analysis of and policy towards the unemployed? The analysis of recurrent 
unemployment is one example. Another would be the estimation of 
microeconometric models of unemployment duration using a sample of the 
individual spell data. The data contain, or could be organised so as to 
contain, complete records of the unemployment benefits received within benefit 
spells - amounts, entitlement periods etc - together with a number of relevant 
personal characteristics such as sex, age, occupation, past earnings etc. 
There is a big literature from the OECD area on which such analysis could draw 
(reviewed in Kiefer 1988); some of it uses data drawn from administrative 
registers, for example the work by Katz and Meyer (1990) who consider the 
impact of variations in the entitlement period of unemployment benefit on the 
length of time people stay unemployed. The code indicating the reason for 
termination of a spell would allow a "competing-risks" model, in which the 
determinants of the separate exit probabilities to different states - 
employment, training schemes, disqualification etc - are estimated. An 
example of this type of model is provided by Edin (1989).
The results from microeconometric models would produce information on 
how the probability of leaving unemployment varies with personal 
characteristics, such as age, and the parameters of the benefit system. 
Experience in the OECD area suggests that the impact of the benefit system 
would be hard to determine with precision (Atkinson and Micklewright, 
forthcoming) but the attempt would still be worthwhile. Even more information 
could be derived from a specially designed survey of unemployment. This could 
collect information on relevant characteristics of the unemployed and of their 
families; it would be possible to attach detailed information on the receipt 
of benefits for each individual in the sample survey from the NLC benefit 
spell records (an example of a study using a merged data set of this sort is 
that by Narendranathan et al, 1985).
4. Conclusions
In this paper I have explored some of the issues and data sources 
relevant to a proper analysis of both living standards and incentives for the 
unemployed in Hungary. The issues include the operation in practice of 
unemployment compensation, the impact of the tax system, the existence of 



























































































incomes of other family members. It is not sufficient to restrict attention 
to a limited range of parameters of the unemployment compensation scheme as 
revealed in a social security manual. And the impact of these parameters, 
such as the provisions for minimum levels of benefit, need careful 
consideration. As far as data are concerned, a principal theme of the paper 
has been the need for more information to be collected about the incomes and 
other circumstances of unemployed persons' households. This would be best 
achieved through sample surveys, preferably conducted by an organisation 
independent of the Ministry of Labour, such as the CSO or a private surveying 
firm. I have also argued for more use to be made of existing information 
based on administrative sources. I demonstrated some of the features of these 
data; this revealed a benefit system which in practice works in a way which 
may surprise some commentators. For example, around half of the unemployed 
receiving benefit in 1990 appear to have had payments at a level equal or 
below the lowest legal wage offer. The average benefit payment was roughly 
equal to the official minimum subsistence income level. Viewed in this way, 
unemployment compensation in Hungary does not appear particularly generous. 
Spells of unemployment benefit typically end in work but the importance of 
other reasons for termination, including disqualification, should not be 
overlooked. Suggestions were made for how these data could be used in 
econometric analysis, were the microdata to be made available.
At the same time some comment has been offered on the 1991 unemployment 
benefit scheme which represented a substantial reform of the previous scheme 
introduced in 1989. In some respects the 1991 scheme represents a significant 
improvement. The proportion of the inflow into unemployment covered by 
unemployment benefits should rise although it is less clear that coverage of 
the stock will improve as the structure of unemployment in Hungary begins to 
"mature" with the development of significant long-term and recurrent 
unemployment.
One conclusion about the 1991 reform is again a methodological one. It 
seems to me impossible that this reform could have been based on adequate 
knowledge of what the 1989 scheme did or did not achieve; certainly there 
would have been insufficient household survey data on the unemployed at the 
time and my belief is that the laudable amount of administrative data 
collected by the National Labour Centre had been severely under-exploited. 
One might also ask how necessary was a major reform of unemployment 




























































































system in need of urgent government attention, notably social assistance and 
the pension scheme (World Bank, 1991). An alternative would have been to make 
some changes to the existing scheme (such as the introduction of career 
entrants' benefit) pending the results of detailed analysis of the scheme's 
effects on both living standards and incentives. Repeated change in the 
unemployment benefit scheme (or in any other part of the state income support 
system) should be avoided, but pressure for this will develop if the defects 
of existing schemes and the implications of new schemes are not fully 
assessed. Future reform in Hungary, and elsewhere, should be undertaken in 







































































































18 months employment in the 3 years 
prior to claim.
Expired entitlement to Unemployment 
Benefit.
12 months in a 3 year period. 
12 months.
(i) 70% of previous gross earnings for 
first 6 months, then 60%. These rates 
are 65% and 55% in the event of 
voluntary quitting when notice is given 
and 60% and 50% if no notice is given.
(ii) maximum benefit is three times the 
minimum wage. In 1989 there was no 
minimum benefit. From January 1990 
minimum benefit is equal to 80% of the 
prevailing minimum wage but if earnings 
are less than the minimum wage, benefit 
is equal to previous earnings.
(i) 75% of previous unemployment 
benefit i.e. 45% of previous gross 
earnings (less for voluntary quitters).
(ii) maximum of twice the minimum wage.
Deductions from Benefit
Both benefits are subject to income tax and a 5% social insurance 
deduction (rather than the 10% paid while in employment).
Financing
































































































New Unemployment Compensation scheme. March 1991




Period of Insured Employment Period of Benefit
in the previous 4 years










Note: entitlement is suspended for 3 months if unemployment is the result of 
a voluntary quit or industrial misconduct.
(b) Career Beginners Benefit: 6 months
Benefit Rate
(a) Unemployment Insurance: (i) 70% of previous gross earnings for first
half of the entitlement period and 50% in the second half.
(ii) minimum benefit is the prevailing 
minimum wage (or the previous wage with the last employer if this was lower 
than the minimum); maximum benefit is three times the minimum wage.
(b) Career Beginners Benefit: 75% of the prevailing minimum wage 
Deductions from Benefit
Benefits subject to income tax but no social insurance deductions.
Financing
Employer contribution of 1.5% of earnings, and 0.5% employee contribution.
12 months insured employment in the 4 years 
prior to claim.
(i) Diploma obtained at the daytime faculty 
of a secondary, or higher grade, of education 
institute within the 12 months prior to claim.
(ii) registered unemployed for 3 months 
during which time no suitable vacancy proposed 


















































































































until the end of 
March 5,800
April- 7,000
Source: Javaslat a minimalber emelesere.




































































































up to 4,800 1.4 2.1 1.7
4,801-5,500 2.5 4.4 3.4
5,501-6,000 4.6 9.1 6.8
6,001-8,000 14.7 30.1 22.2
8,001-10,000 29.7 50.8 40.0
10,001-12,000 45.2 66.5 55.5
12,001-14,000 58.6 77.0 67.5
14,001-16,000 69.1 83.8 76.3
16,001-20,000 82.2 91.5 86.7
20,001-30,000 94.3 97.7 95.9
30,001-50,000 98.7 99.6 99.1
50,001 plus 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: unpublished information from CSO census of employers who are obliged to 


































































































Receiving Unemployment Benefit 58,460
Receiving Temporary Allowance 3,233
Source: NLC, 1991, pp.4-5
Table 6
Distribution of Number of Spells per Person on 
Unemployment Compensation. 1989-90













Budapest 4,367 208 27 4,602 5.1
Baranya 6,131 341 38 6,510 5.8
Bacs-Kiskun 4,298 113 4 4,415 2.7
Bekes 6,246 220 11 6,477 3.6
Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen 10,832 1,001 92 11,925 9.2
Csongrad 4,387 217 10 4,614 4.9
Fejer 3,426 203 19 3,648 6.1
Gyor-Sopron 3,314 216 18 3,548 6.6
Hajdu-Bihar 3,666 90 3 3,759 2.5
Heves 3,348 191 7 3,546 5.6
Komarom-Esztergom 2,656 83 4 2,743 3.2
Nograd 5,641 351 35 6,027 6.4
Pest 5,619 234 24 5,877 4.4
Somogy 4,299 224 13 4,536 5.2
Szabolocs-Szatmar 16,110 779 75 16,964 5.0
Szolnok 5,984 386 26 6,396 6.4
Tolna 4,096 191 3 4,290 4.5
V as 1,385 55 2 1,442 4.0
Veszprem 4,460 214 13 4,687 4.8
Zala 2,073 64 5 2,142 3.2
Hungary 102,338 5,381 429 108,148 5.4





























































































Amounts of Unemployment Compensation Paid: 
All Spells of Benefit Receipt during 1990
Unemployment Temporary
Benefit Allowance
Forints per Number Number
month (gross) of payments of payments
- 3,000 2,531 304
3,001 - 40,721 2,965
5,001 - 26,593 373
8,001 - 10,897 121






Men 6,542 Ft 4,367 Ft
Women 4,959 Ft 3,845 Ft
All 5,889 Ft 4,156 Ft




























































































Importance of Each Cause of Termination for Spells 
of Unemployment Benefit (UBI u p  to 360 Days
All completed spells, 1989-90, excluding those ending 
through exhaustion of benefit entitlement.
a) Men
Share of each Cause (%)
Length of Benefit Spell (Days)
Cause of Termination -30 31-90 91-180 181-360 Total
Re-employed/Empl. Scheme 71.7 70.9 65.3 57.9 67.2
Retraining 2.0 4.9 7.7 9.4 7.0
Earning above Min. Wage 0.4 0.9 1.5 2.1 1.2
Disqualification 9.0 7.1 6.8 6.5 7.2
Retired 0.4 0.8 1.7 2.5 1.3
Death 0.6 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.6
Other 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.3
Unknown 15.7 14.9 16.1 20.0 16.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number of spells 3,753 7,326 5,950 3,598 20,627
b) Homen
Share of each Cause (%)
Length of Benefit Spell (Days)
Cause of Termination -30 31-90 91-180 181-360 Total
Re-emp1oyed/Emp1. Scheme 70.0 67.7 61.8 55.4 64.0
Retraining 2.1 5.2 7.2 9.0 6.0
Earning above Min. Wage 0.4 0.9 1.1 1.8 1.1
Disqualification 8.5 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.5
Retired 0.3 0.8 2.0 3.2 1.5
Death 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2
Other 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.2 0.5
Unknown 18.3 17.7 19.7 21.5 19.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number of spells 2,335 4,843 4,100 2,545 13,853





























































































Registered Unemployment In Hungary
1990 1991





























































































1990 and 1991 Benefit Schemes
benefit as % 
of current 
minimum wage
--------  Unemployment Insurance (Ul) in 1991
—  —  Unemployment Benefit (UB) in 1990 (where different)
Source: Tables 1 and 2
Note: The schedules depicted apply to a claimant in the first half of the 
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